Part IV — Where everyone else is standing
Chapter 11
Harari and Keynes: the question's lineage
You've met Keynes twice already, once for his date in Chapter 7 and once for his warning in Chapter 8, and I'm bringing him back a last time because he also left an answer.
He'll have company. The last two chapters were about people with something to propose. Susskind has a policy. The Manifesto has a protocol. Nobody in this chapter is proposing anything. It's about the question itself, and about two people who put it about as plainly as it can be put. One did it in a book from the last ten years. The other did it in 1930.
The sharpest way to ask it
Yuval Noah Harari is a historian. In his book Homo Deus he asks it in one sentence:
The most important question in 21st-century economics may well be: What should we do with all the superfluous people, once we have highly intelligent non-conscious algorithms that can do almost everything better than humans?
Superfluous people. He doesn't soften it. He also gives them a name:
In the 21st century we might witness the creation of a massive new unworking class: people devoid of any economic, political or even artistic value, who contribute nothing to the prosperity, power and glory of society. This “useless class” will not merely be unemployed — it will be unemployable.
I'm not quoting that to scare you. I'm quoting it because it's honest about something the money conversation skips.
Look at what he's measuring with. Economic value. Political value. Artistic value. Each one is what a person is worth to something bigger than they are: the economy, the state, the culture. Take those three away and, by this way of counting, there is nothing left to say about you.
He's clear about why that would be new. CBC's written report of a 2017 radio interview has him making the point that even dictatorships relied on millions of people to keep the factories running and to serve in the military. Being needed is leverage. The people who control the new technology, he said in that report, won't exploit the poor, because they just won't need them; and rebelling against irrelevance is much harder than rebelling against exploitation.
That's the worry in its strongest form, and I think he has the stakes right. A paycheck was never only income. It was proof that somebody needed you.
He doesn't claim to know
What I respect about Harari is that he doesn't pretend to have the answer. He tries a few on, in public, and tells you which ones he doesn't like.
The darkest one is in Homo Deus. If technology can feed and support people "even without any effort from their side," he asks, what will keep them "occupied and content"? Then, flatly: "One answer might be drugs and computer games." He doesn't leave it there. He adds that a life spent in virtual worlds "would deal a mortal blow to the liberal belief in the sacredness of human life and of human experiences."
Elsewhere he's gentler. In the same CBC report he points out that a job is only one way of giving people meaning and purpose, and that children seem to live full lives without any jobs at all.
That same year he wrote an essay for The Guardian with a small scene in it. He's walking down the street with his six-year-old nephew, Matan, who is hunting Pokémon on a phone. "I didn’t see any Pokémon at all," Harari writes, "because I didn’t carry a smartphone." The boy's walk is full of things his uncle can't see. Harari's point is that people have always lived this way, inside games and stories and faiths that give a day its shape, with or without a job. He lands here: "the end of work will not necessarily mean the end of meaning, because meaning is generated by imagining rather than by working."
So he gives you both versions, the hard one and the kind one, and he's open that he's laying out possibilities. Technology, he says in the CBC report, is never deterministic. I take him at his word.
Now look at where the two versions put the answer.
In the hard one, your worth gets settled from the outside, by whether the economy or the state or the culture has a use for you. In the kind one, your meaning gets made on the inside. He says so directly: the meaning we give to what we see "is generated by our own minds." And he adds, "The meaning of life is always a fictional story created by us humans."
Outside, or inside. There's a third place it could come from, and neither version goes there: the other person. The one you did something for.
Meaning you make for yourself is real, and I'm not arguing with it. But it's a different thing from somebody else being able to say that what you did changed something for them. Harari's question is about people nobody needs. Meaning made alone can't answer that, because nobody else is in it.
The man who asked in 1930
John Maynard Keynes got to this question ninety-six years ago, as I write this. It's the same essay you've already met, first printed in The Nation and Athenæum in October 1930.
You have his date and his dread, and I won't repeat them. What I held back is how he put the question itself. Once the struggle to get by is over, he wrote, a person comes up against "his real, his permanent problem," which is how "to live wisely and agreeably and well."
Set that next to Harari's sentence. Harari asks what we should do with the superfluous people. Keynes asks how a person who has been set free is going to live. It's the same future. One question is asked about people. The other is asked from where they stand.
Then he answers it, a little. Once there's enough, he thought, what people admire would have to change. He wrote:
We shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good to the useful. We shall honour those who can teach us how to pluck the hour and the day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the lilies of the field who toil not, neither do they spin.
Notice the verb. Honour. He isn't talking about who gets paid. He's saying that when there is enough to go around, the thing that moves is who we look up to, and why.
And notice the other word. Prefer the good to the useful. Set that next to Harari's phrase. A class of people can only be useless if useful is the test. Keynes, in 1930, is saying the test itself is due to change.
I think that's the most hopeful sentence anybody in this Part has written. It's also where he stops, and he stops in three places.
First, who is "we"? He doesn't say. It's the same small word Chapter 9 ran into, sitting in the same spot, almost a century earlier.
Second, he tells you who gets the honor: the people who can teach the rest of us how to live well. He doesn't tell you how. Who notices that somebody taught them something? Who says so? What is the honor made of, once it isn't money? The essay is silent on all of it.
Third, he puts it off. The very next paragraph opens, "But beware! The time for all this is not yet." Chapter 7 did the counting. The time he was putting it off to is about now.
Nobody yet
Part IV asks every neighbor the same thing: who decides what counts?
Susskind said "we." The Manifesto said the people you improved, weighted by a protocol. Harari and Keynes, between them, say: nobody yet. Harari asks the question and offers answers he doesn't trust. Keynes says the honor will move, and leaves it to move on its own.
I don't hold that against either of them. Asking a question this clearly is real work. And I'd rather claim the lineage than pretend this book found the question. It didn't. The question is at least ninety-six years old, and Harari himself says of it, "This is not an entirely new question."
What neither of them gives us is a person in the answer. In Harari, you're either measured from the outside or left alone with your own imagination. In Keynes, you're honored by a "we" that never gets a name.
The next neighbor starts from the other end. He puts the person right in the middle of the answer, and says the person can settle it from the inside.