The Value Era

Part IV — Where everyone else is standing

Chapter 9

Susskind: who decides what counts


Who decides what counts?

That's the question Part III left for everyone who has looked at the clock and proposed something. If a paycheck stops being the signal that what you did mattered, something else has to say so. Somebody is doing the saying.

I think of the people in this Part as neighbors. Each one is standing somewhere close to where this book stands, and each one gets real room here: the strongest version of what they're saying first, then the place where they stop. The question is the same for all of them. So is the test. What happens to the person who holds the door?

We start with an economist.

A lecture hall in April

On Monday, April 20, 2026, Daniel Susskind stood up at Gresham College in London to give a lecture called "A World Without Work." He's an economist and a writer, and he holds Gresham's professorship of business. The lecture was one of a series on the future of work.

If you came for a prophet of doom, he opened by letting you down. He explained why the people who worried about machines taking the work have, so far, been wrong. Technology does two things at once, he says. It substitutes for people at some tasks, and it raises the demand for people at others. For a few hundred years the second force has won. In the text he published with the lecture: "In the clash between these two fundamental forces, our worried ancestors time and again tended to pick the wrong winner."

Then he made the case that it might not keep winning. Machines keep taking on tasks that used to need a person. He calls it "task encroachment." As that goes on, the tasks where people still hold the advantage could shrink to a set too small to keep everyone in well-paid work. He doesn't picture a crash. In his words, "the world of work comes to an end not with a bang, but a withering."

Here's what I want you to notice about how he says it. He calls it a scenario. "Is that scenario inevitable? No, of course not. But is it possible – I argue that it is." He writes that the leaders of the big technology companies are all claiming roughly the same thing, that "within five to ten years, we will build an AI that can outperform human beings at every economically useful task that we do." And in the hall he told the audience to take claims like that with a pinch of salt, because of "the strong financial interest that these companies have in talking up the capabilities of these technologies." Then, in the next breath, he gave three reasons to take them seriously anyway. He says the problem in front of us today is a different one: the work exists, and for real reasons people can't get to it. And he says, after all of it, "I nevertheless remain optimistic about the future of AI and work."

No hype. No fear. A careful person saying: this might happen, and if it does, here is what we'd have to deal with.

Four problems where most people see one

What we'd have to deal with is the part that earns him this chapter.

He names four problems. Distribution: "how to share prosperity in society when our traditional way of doing so, paying people for the work that they do, is less effective than in the past." Contribution: "how to provide people with a way to contribute to the collective pot" when work and taxes no longer do it. Meaning. And power, the political power of the companies building the technology.

Think back to the two clocks in Part III. Both of them count one thing: how soon there's enough to go around. That's his first problem, and it's where the loud conversation you heard in Part III starts and ends. Who gets the money. How big the check is.

Susskind says the check is one problem out of four. And in the hall that evening he pressed on the second one harder than the printed page does:

"We spend far less time on this problem of contribution, on the issue of contributive justice. How do we provide everyone in the future with an opportunity to contribute and to be seen by others to be contributing as well?"

Look at the end of that sentence. To contribute, and to be seen by others to be contributing.

That's an economist, in public, in 2026, saying that having an income is one question and being seen to contribute is another. I couldn't ask for a clearer statement of what this book is worried about, and it isn't mine. If you finish this chapter believing only one thing, believe that the question is real and that serious people are already asking it.

His answer

So what does he do with it?

In the questions afterward, someone in the hall asked what he made of a universal basic income. Here is the substance of his answer. A universal basic income settles the first problem. Everybody gets an income, wherever they stand in the job market. What it leaves alone is the second. It doesn't deal with how people get a chance to contribute and to be seen contributing. So what he argues for is a basic income with a condition attached. The condition isn't paid work. It is, perhaps, taking up certain activities that count as worthwhile to society, in exchange for the support.

About five weeks later, in his next lecture, he came back to it, and this is how he put it. If the labor market stops sharing income well, the state has to take a larger role, and he was specific about what kind: "It's not a big state of production. It's a big state of distribution." Then, on contribution, he said we would have to explore "very different types of proposals." His example:

"providing people with the opportunity to make non-economic contributions to society, to do other types of work which we think is socially valuable, socially meaningful and important even if it's not paid work in the labor market"

Give this its due. It's a floor of support. It refuses the easy move of mailing a check and calling the job done. And he offers it as a direction, hedged, to a room he's asking to think with him.

Who is "we"?

Now read his example one more time. Work "which we think is socially valuable."

We who?

He doesn't say. In the two lectures and the Q&A this chapter draws on, the state has a job, and the job is distribution. The judging, the part where somebody decides which activities are the valuable ones, belongs to a "we" that never gets a name.

He never calls it a list, and I don't want to put the word in his mouth. But a condition has to be written down before anybody can meet it. Somebody has to say, ahead of time, these activities qualify and those don't. However kindly it's done, that's a list.

And here's where the promise and the delivery come apart. The promise was that people would be seen to be contributing. What gets delivered is recognition by category. Your kind of activity is on the list or it isn't, and that was settled before you did anything, by people who weren't there when you did it.

You've already watched what happens when a group has to settle what counts. In Part II, six professional rating firms looked at the same companies and came back with different answers, mostly over how to count and also over what to count. Whoever "we" turns out to be, they inherit that.

So, the test. The person who held the door for you gets paid for it only if "we" put door-holding on the list.

Who is watching

There's a second thing in his sentence, and it's quieter.

Seen by others. Which others?

He gives you a clue. Today, he says, "social solidarity often comes from a feeling that everybody is pulling their economic weight through the work that they do and the taxes that they pay." Read that way, the others are everybody else. The public. The people paying in, who need to know that the people drawing out are doing their part. Right after it, he notes that people who can work are expected to look for it, and that a lot of welfare is already conditional on that.

That's a real need and I'm not going to wave it away. A society where people suspect each other of coasting doesn't hold together.

But it's a different kind of seeing from the one this book is about. In his, the one watching is the public, and what they're checking is whether you did your share. In this book, the one who sees is the person who walked through the door. They were there. They know whether anything happened.

Where he stops

He stops in three places, and to his credit he marks each one himself.

On meaning, he stays conditional. In print: "if work is not only a source of income but also of meaning and purpose." In the hall: "it's often said that work isn't simply a source of income, but it's also a source of direction and fulfillment in life. And if that is right," then losing work costs people more than money. If. When the basic income question came up, he laid out both camps, the people who think a job is where purpose comes from and the people who think that's a mistake, and he didn't pick one.

On what to do about it, he asks a question. "Do we need to start thinking about leisure policies, how we intervene to shape people's non-working lives instead?" It's a good question. It isn't a policy yet.

And on his best answer, he's plain about its reach. His answer is education. He writes that "‘more education’ remains our best response to technological disruption in the world of work." For today's problem, he means it. For the further-off world this chapter has been about, the one without enough work, he calls education "an ineffective response," and says "we will have to consider very different responses."

So one of the most careful people working on this names the problem, pulls it apart from income, proposes a floor with a condition on it, and leaves the judge as "we."

No shade there. He told the room that people are going to disagree hard about all four problems, and that they're still far better problems to have than the one our ancestors were stuck with, which was how to make enough for everybody in the first place. I think he's right about that too. And this chapter rests on what he said in public in 2026. If he names the "we" somewhere I haven't cited, I'll be glad to be corrected.

But somebody has already tried to fill in the blank. They didn't do it with a committee. They did it with a protocol.

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