Part III — The clock
Chapter 8
Without a role
Go back to the doorman from Chapter 5. He's still made up. I want to borrow him for one more morning.
Say he's been at that door for years. He knows who is going to have their hands full and who would rather be left alone. Then one Monday the building puts in an automatic door. A sensor above the frame, two panes of glass, and they slide apart for anybody who walks up.
Now make it the kind version. Nobody lets him go. The building keeps him on at full pay. Same uniform, same lobby, same check on Friday.
What did he lose?
Run the door from Chapter 2 again, from the side of the person walking in. The glass slides open. I got time back. Still true. One less thing to worry about. The coffee doesn't spill. I got what I came for. You're inside. The machine delivers nearly all of it, and it does it every time, in the rain, at three in the morning.
One thing on the list went missing. We trust each other more. A stranger noticed you, and you noticed them. A sensor notices you too, in its way. Nothing passes between you.
That's your side of the door. Now his. He still has the income. What's gone is that nobody walking through needs him to be there. Nobody is on the receiving end of a person anymore. He can stand in that lobby all day, fully paid, and there is no one in a position to say that what he did this morning was worth something, because there was nothing left for him to do.
Hold on to the kind version, because it's the one that matters here. In the unkind version he loses the paycheck, and we all know what to call that. In the kind version he keeps it, and most of us don't have a word for what's missing.
The last chapter ended on a question. If the money keeps arriving, what happens to a person whose part in things is gone? The doorman is that question with a uniform on. He's imagined. The rest of this chapter is what the record says, and I'm going to be careful with it, because the record is thinner than I'd like.
A word for what went missing
Sociologists have a word. It's mattering.
An early statement of the idea is a paper Morris Rosenberg and B. Claire McCullough presented in 1979. They started with teenagers and their parents. The summary of that paper lists what they asked about: "the feeling that one is an object of interest to parents, that one is important to parents, that one is an object of concern, that one's opinions count, and that one is wanted." And it reports that "feelings that one matters are associated with many dimensions of mental health."
That isn't the same as being liked, and it isn't the same as being paid.
The link to a role came later. In 2007 Elena Fazio, at the University of Maryland, wrote a dissertation that picked up a suggestion from Rosenberg and McCullough. In her summary, they had proposed that "older adults feel they matter less than middle-aged adults and this discrepancy may in part be explained by a lack of role occupancies such as paid work, and a devaluation of the old in society at large."
She tested it in a survey of more than 1,100 adults over 65 in the Washington, D.C. area. She measured two sides of mattering: whether other people depend on you, and whether you're important to them. The older people were, the less they reported of either one, and part of the explanation was that they held fewer roles and were in poorer health. Then this: "Compared to informal ties, work and volunteer roles (productive or formal roles), are more important in explaining the relationship between age and mattering."
Look at who's on that list. Work and volunteer roles, reported together. Her summary adds that the two didn't work the same way for everyone. The work role helped explain the pattern for white respondents and not for African-American respondents. The volunteer role helped explain it for African-American respondents, on the side about being depended on, and not for white respondents.
Here's my reading of that, and it's mine, not the study's. A volunteer role doesn't pay, and it sits on that list next to a job. What I think the two have in common is that somebody is counting on you to show up.
Now the limits. This is one survey, taken once, of older adults in one metropolitan area. It shows that roles and mattering move together. It can't show which one causes the other. People who already feel they matter may be the ones who go and find roles. I'm using it as a description of what the doorman lost. It isn't proof of what losing it does.
What Keynes was afraid of
Keynes gave us the first date. He also gave us the first warning, and it's in the same essay, a page or two after the hundred years.
Having predicted that the economic problem would be solved, he turned around and looked at what that would cost. "If the economic problem is solved, mankind will be deprived of its traditional purpose." And then: "Yet I think with dread of the readjustment of the habits and instincts of the ordinary man, bred into him for countless generations, which he may be asked to discard within a few decades."
Dread, from the man making the optimistic forecast. He asked, "must we not expect a general 'nervous breakdown'?"
He thought he could already see a preview. The wealthy of his own day, he wrote, were "our advance guard," the people "spying out the promised land for the rest of us and pitching their camp there." His report on the advance guard was not good: "they have most of them failed disastrously, so it seems to me." And he said exactly who he meant: "those who have an independent income but no associations or duties or ties."
That is the doorman on full pay, described in 1930.
The example Keynes reached for shows its age. He pointed to "the wives of the well-to-do classes," women "who have been deprived by their wealth of their traditional tasks and occupations." Set the 1930 assumptions about women to one side and look at the mechanism, because it's exact. Deprived by their wealth. The money arrived, and the role left.
Two cautions, because I don't want to make him say more than he said.
This is an impression, and he tells you so: "so it seems to me." He didn't study the leisured rich. He looked around at them.
And he was looking at a small, unusual group and asking a question about everyone else. He didn't answer it with evidence, and I can't answer it from his essay either. He had hopes for how the rest of us would do. Those belong to a later chapter.
The men in twenty-four towns
There is harder evidence than an impression, and it comes with a limit I have to show you.
Between 1978 and 1980, researchers in Britain enrolled middle-aged men in a heart study, through one doctor's practice in each of 24 towns. In 1994 three researchers, Morris, Cook and Shaper, published what the study showed about work. They looked at 6,191 men, aged 40 to 59, who had all been steadily employed for at least five years. Over the next five years some of those men lost their jobs, and some retired. Then the researchers counted who died in the five and a half years after that.
The men who had been unemployed were, in the abstract's words, "twice as likely to die during the following 5.5 years as men who remained continuously employed." The researchers adjusted for the town, for social class, for smoking, drinking and weight, and for the diagnoses the men remembered their doctors giving them. The gap barely moved.
I'm not an epidemiologist, so I'm staying close to what the authors wrote. They concluded that the result held "even after adjustment for background variables, suggesting a causal effect." Suggesting. This was not an experiment. Nobody assigned these men to lose their jobs, and something the researchers couldn't see may have been behind both the job loss and the deaths.
Here is the limit that matters most for this chapter. A man who loses his job loses his income and his role on the same day. This study can't pull the two apart. It can't tell me the doorman on full pay is in any danger, because it has no doormen on full pay in it.
It comes closest in one sentence. Some of the men retired early, and not because they were sick. The abstract says: "Even men who retired early for reasons other than illness and who appeared to be relatively advantaged and healthy had a significantly increased risk of mortality compared with men who remained continuously employed." Their risk was close to double.
The abstract doesn't say what those men were living on. But "relatively advantaged and healthy" is not how you describe someone who was thrown into hardship. It's the nearest thing in this record to the income staying and the role going, and it leans the way Keynes leaned. It is still a pattern among middle-aged British men in the 1980s, and it is still not proof.
What the cash studies can tell us
There's one more kind of evidence, and it comes at the question from the other side. Give people money with no conditions attached, and see what it does.
A large American study of this kind was run by a research group called OpenResearch. From November 2020 until October 2023, 1,000 low-income adults, aged 21 to 40, received $1,000 a month. Another 2,000 received $50 a month, for comparison. This one was a real experiment. Who got which amount was decided at random.
The researchers' summary of the health results is short. The money "produced large but short-lived improvements in stress and food security." It "did not improve self-reported physical health, clinical biomarkers, or mental health after the first year."
Large but short-lived. The money did real good. People were less stressed and less worried about food, and they used more medical and dental care. Then the improvement in stress faded, and mental health was no better after the first year, while the money kept coming for two more.
I have to be careful about what that shows.
It did not study people who had lost a role. The researchers' summary doesn't mention any measure of whether these adults felt needed. So nothing in it says the gain faded because something like a role was missing. What it can say is narrower. Money, by itself, did not hold the gain in how people felt.
And other studies cut the other way.
In Stockton, California, 131 people received $500 a month for two years, starting in February 2019, with 200 others as the comparison group. The researchers reported "lower mental distress, better energy and physical functioning" among the people getting the money, and "greater agency to explore new opportunities related to employment and caregiving." That is cash making people feel better and try more. Most of those differences showed up in the first year, before the pandemic. After that, in the authors' words, "The significance of those impacts dissipated as the pandemic had critical financial and health impacts across both the treatment and control groups." "In atypical conditions," they concluded, "the effects of guaranteed income are inconclusive and worthy of additional investigation." That's fair. A pandemic is a hard place to test anything.
In Finland, 2,000 unemployed people were chosen at random to receive 560 euros a month through 2017 and 2018. Heikki Hiilamo, a professor of social policy at the University of Helsinki, summed up the survey that followed: "the basic income group had clearly higher subjective wellbeing across a large variety of measures." Then he gave the catch. "There was no baseline survey to analyse changes during the experiment." Nobody had asked the same people the same questions before the money started. So, as he reports the research group concluding, "it is not possible to determine if the positive results can be attributed to basic income."
Here's the fair picture, then. Unconditional cash helps. In two of these studies the money made people's lives measurably better, and in the third the people who got it reported being better off. Whether the lift in how people feel lasts is not settled. It faded in one study, it was overtaken by a pandemic in the second, and it can't be pinned on the money in the third. And the thing this chapter is about is missing from all of it. The Stockton paper has no measure of whether these people felt anybody was counting on them, and the summaries of the other two don't mention one.
What the clock is counting down to
Let me say plainly how much I've shown you, because it's less than a headline would claim.
I don't have a study that takes away a person's role, leaves their income alone, and measures what happens. Nothing in this chapter is one. What I have is a set of things that lean the same way. A sociologist's word for being counted on, and a survey in which work and volunteer roles explain it better than informal ties do. An economist's dread in 1930, and his impression of the people who got there first. A study of British men in which the ones who left work early, "relatively advantaged and healthy," were more likely to die in the years that followed. And three experiments in giving people money, which helped, and which never tested this.
That's correlation and impression. I'm calling it that so nobody has to catch me dressing it up.
But think about what the argument in the last chapter was about. How soon there's enough, and who gets it. It runs as if the rest takes care of itself once those two are settled. The evidence doesn't prove that's wrong. It gives no reason to think it's right. And the bet is being placed on everybody.
So here is what I think is at stake when the clock runs down. It isn't only whether people eat. It's whether a person can still find out that they matter to someone, and who gets to say so.
For the doorman, there used to be an answer to that. The person walking through the door could say it. Four seconds, a nod, a thanks. The automatic door didn't take his income. It took away everyone who could tell him.
A lot of serious people have looked at this clock and proposed something. The next five chapters are theirs.