Part III — The clock
Chapter 7
2030 and 2036
In 1930, with the world sliding into the Depression, the English economist John Maynard Keynes published a short essay about his readers' grandchildren.
He knew what kind of year it was. The first sentence is, "We are suffering just now from a bad attack of economic pessimism." A few paragraphs on he writes about "the enormous anomaly of unemployment in a world full of wants." And then he sets all of it aside and asks a question that has nothing to do with 1930: "What can we reasonably expect the level of our economic life to be a hundred years hence?"
He called the essay "Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren."
Count it forward. A hundred years from 1930 is 2030. The grandchildren are us.
A hundred years hence
Here is his answer, whole, because the wording matters:
"I draw the conclusion that, assuming no important wars and no important increase in population, the economic problem may be solved, or be at least within sight of solution, within a hundred years."
By "the economic problem" he meant what he called "the struggle for subsistence." Enough food, enough shelter, enough of the basics that getting them stops being what a life is organized around. He thought that struggle had an end date, and he put it about a century out.
I want to be fair to that sentence before I lean on it.
It's a round number. He didn't claim to know the year. "A hundred years hence" is how you say in my grandchildren's time when you want to be taken seriously.
It came with two conditions, no important wars and no important increase in population, and neither one held. A second world war began nine years later, and the world has several times as many people in it now as it did then.
And he wasn't writing about artificial intelligence. His engine was compound interest and ordinary technical progress, capital and efficiency each growing a little every year for a century.
He did see one thing coming that will sound familiar. He warned about "a new disease of which some readers may not yet have heard the name," and then he named it: "technological unemployment." He defined it as "unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour." Then he called it "only a temporary phase of maladjustment" and went back to the grandchildren.
So I'm not borrowing his reasons. I'm borrowing his clock. In 1930 a serious person wrote down a date by which the struggle for enough might be more or less over. That date is now a little over three years away.
Ten years out
The second date is newer, and you've met it already.
In July 2026 The Economist released an interview its editor-in-chief, Zanny Minton Beddoes, recorded with Elon Musk at Tesla's factory in Texas. You heard a little of it in Chapter 1. Here is more of the room, because how the date came up matters.
Early on she asked him what the world would be like "in, let's say, 10 years if you succeed." He did the arithmetic out loud: "10 years. So we're talking 2036."
Later she pushed him on how his companies would make money, "because in the end people are buying your shares because they expect you to make money."
"I'll make another prediction," he said. "Money won't matter in 2036."
She didn't let it pass. "I'm not sure that the people who bought your shares think that money won't matter in 2036."
His answer is the whole argument in four sentences: "Well, what do you want money for? You want money for goods and services, right? You want money for obviously food, housing, transport, entertainment. Well, if that is so abundant that the robots and AI are providing more goods and services than any human could possibly consume, what do you need money for in that case?"
"But you're creating these robots," she said.
"I guess every now and then you'll need money, sure."
She asked what people would live on while all of this arrives. "I think that the Treasury should just simply issue people checks." She said that sounded like a recipe for inflation. He said the reverse: "deflation will be the issue, not inflation." If the supply of goods and services grows faster than the supply of money, prices fall.
The month before, he had posted the short version, the one from Chapter 1: "Mass & energy will take the place of dollars."
I want to be fair to him too. He wasn't selling a paradise. In the same conversation he said he was "not trying to be some Candide here," and then, "I'm saying there is some risk." And look again at where the year came from. She asked about ten years. Ten years from 2026 is 2036. That's the whole derivation.
Two round numbers
So that's the clock. A century, set in 1930. A decade, set in 2026. As I write this, late in 2026, the first runs out in a little over three years and the second in ten.
I'm not going to tell you whether either one arrives. I don't know. I'm treating both as what they are, which is dated claims. A person said it, on a day, on the record, and other people answered. Nothing in this book depends on the dates being right. The argument has to hold up if both of them slip.
The answers are worth hearing, because of what they're about.
The investor Vinod Khosla posted on X that he would "modify" the prediction. As Fortune reported it, his qualifier was that money won't matter in 2036 "only if the politics permits this great abundance."
Daron Acemoglu, a Nobel-winning economist, posted a dare. "An opportunity to put your money where your mouth is. If money won't matter in 2036, why don't you pledge to donate your current wealth of approximately $1 trillion to charity no later than 2036." A few hours later Musk replied to a post that shared it: "I am actually going to do something along these lines!"
Read those two again. Neither one says the machines can't make enough. Khosla says whether the abundance arrives at all depends on politics. Acemoglu says that if you believe money is about to stop mattering, you can hand yours over. His dare is about who ends up holding what.
Cheap is not the same as gone
There's a quieter version of the abundance claim, and it's worth keeping separate, because the two get run together.
Peter Diamandis has a framework he calls the 6 Ds, a list of what happens to a technology once it goes digital. One of the six is demonetization. He puts it this way: "Once you have a product represented as 1s and 0s, the costs of replication and transmission are both effectively free."
That's a claim about cost. Once a song or a map or a photograph is digital, another copy costs next to nothing. It is not a claim that money goes away, and I don't want to hang Musk's sentence on Diamandis. Things getting cheap and money not mattering are two different predictions.
But look at what the careful version does to Part I. Price, we said, became the dominant, default definition of value, and anything that never gets a price sits outside its edges. Demonetization is that edge moving. Things that used to carry a price stop carrying one. They don't stop mattering. They stop showing up.
You don't need 2036 for that. You only need the direction.
What both clocks leave out
Here's what I want you to see about the two dates, and about the people answering them.
Every one of them is counting the same thing, which is enough. Keynes was asking when the struggle for subsistence ends. Musk is describing more goods and services than anyone could consume. Khosla is asking whether politics will permit that abundance. Acemoglu is asking who ends up holding the wealth. Those are real questions and I'm not waving them off. People have to eat.
But price has been doing a second job this whole time, and nobody in that conversation is counting it.
Go back to Chapter 1. For a century and a half, the default answer to "what is a person worth?" has been a price. A wage. A salary. A paycheck does more than cover the rent. It's also a signal. It's one of the few ways the world tells you, in a form everybody accepts, that what you did mattered to somebody. I'm not saying it's a good signal. Part I was about how much it misses. I'm saying it's the one we've been using.
So take either clock at its word for a minute. Suppose there really is enough, and the checks really do arrive. The first job of money is handled. What happens to the second?
Musk brushed against it once. Early in that interview, describing how capable the machines will be, he said there "really won't be anything that AI can't do better than humans, apart from being human, perhaps."
Apart from being human, perhaps. He said it and went on to the next thing. This book is about the thing he went past.
And remember what Part II found. A lot of serious people have tried to put something in money's place, and we watched those attempts fail in seven ways. So if price stops doing its second job in three years, or ten, or thirty, none of what we looked at there is standing by to take over. That's why this can't wait for the dates to be settled. A clock doesn't have to be accurate to tell you that you haven't started.
So here is the question for the next chapter, and it's a strange one to ask in a book that began with money. Suppose it goes well. Suppose nobody goes hungry. What happens to a person whose part in things is gone?
Keynes had something to say about that too, in the same essay. He wasn't looking forward to it.